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As individuals engaged in the prevention and treatment of de-
linquency and crime we are especially concerned at this time about
the criminological implications of war. We are interested in learning
to what extent delinquency and crime are by-products of war, how
war produces crime, what types of crimes are on the increase and
decrease, what steps we can take to prevent delinquency and crime,
and what to expect in the postwar period of reconstruction. We
must know these things in order that we may deal effectively with
delinquency and crime not only during wartime, but also in the
aftermath.
Today we hear and read a great deal about the effect of war on
delinquency and crime in the United States, but most of these gen-
eralizations are nothing more than popular notions without the sup-
port of reliable research and statistical data. Even in England it
is much too soon to make anything but tentative statements as to
the effect of war on delinquency and crime, warns Hermann Mann-
heim, 2 London criminologist. Dr. Mannheim, who has made a num-
ber of revealing studies of war and crime, points out that previous
studies of war and crime have demonstrated clearly that any gen-
eralizations about the criminological implications of war are likely
to be misleading, especially since each war has its own character-
istics in so far as crime-producing factors are concerned. The by-
products of mechanized war certainly differ from those of World
War I, and the crime-producing factors resulting from the impact
of the present type of warfare are likely to be different. In the last
war England did not have to meet with air raids, bomb destruction,
shelter life, blackouts, evacuations, and population movements on
such vast scales as characterizes war today. Consequently, Mann-
heim concludes that our traditional concepts about the effect of war
on crime either will have to be modified considerably or abandoned
entirely.
Our country may be spared from large-scale bombings with their
attendant harrowing experiences and resulting conditions, but even
if we do have to undergo these experiences it does not necessarily
I Assistant Chief of Probation, Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts,
Washington, D. C.
2 Hermann Mannheim, "Crime in Wartime England," The Annals, Septem-
ber, 1941. pp. 128-137.
Dr. Mannheim is also author of Social Aspects of Crime in England Between
the Wars (1940), and War and Crime (1941).
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follow that changes in delinquency and crime rates will correspond
with the pattern in England. In the first place, the crime-producing
factors in England in periods of peace are not necessarily the same
as those in our country. Secondly, although such popularly ascribed
peacetime causes of delinquency and crime as poverty, bad housing,
lack of parental control, broken homes, etc., are greatly accentuated
and intensified in wartime England, we must bear in mind that these
causes are not the primary causes of crime; they are merely direct
or inciting causes.
Considerations in Studying Influence of War on Crime
Criminologists tell us that delinquency and crime arise from
an attempt on the part of the individual to satisfy one or a combina-
tion of his fundamental wants and needs; that an individual who
does not acquire satisfactions through socially acceptable behavior,
seeks and finds gratification of his needs through conduct which is
against the established mores of the community. Delinquency and
crime have meaning to him; they represent an attempt on his part
to solve his problems; they seem to promise certain satisfactions
which he is unable to find in socially approved behavior; they are
ways out from states of dissatisfaction and inner stresses resulting
from such disorganizing experiences as poor health, broken homes,
school dissatisfactions, inability to get a job.
Such basic wants and needs as a desire for status and recog-
nition; a sense of belongingness, personal adequacy, and security;
a need for protection and shelter; a yearning for adventure and
escape from monotony and routine, are common to all humans, and
must be satisfied either through socially acceptable conduct, or be-
havior which is socially disapproved. When wartime conditions and
experiences thwart attempts to satisfy these basic human needs,
the individual's dissatisfactions and discomforts may eventually
lead to aggressive behavior, hostilities, discouragements, anxieties,
and a distorted outlook. Therefore, in any study of the effects of
war on delinquency and crime we should consider how wartime
conditions and situations influence the offender's attitudes and feel-
ings about himself and others, and the way he responds to situations
and circumstances which confront him.
It has been said that delinquency and crime will not be as serious
a problem in the United States as in England unless we are victims
of bombings and have to resort to family dislocations, evacuations,
blackouts, and shelter life. This is not a sound conclusion, for we
must remember that the impact of war doubtless will affect our
social institutions-perhaps in a different way from which the in-
stitutions and social and economic life of England are affected-
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and from these changes will come pressures which are sufficient to
force individuals to find substitute satisfactions for their funda-
mental wants and needs in delinquent conduct because they were
unable to find satisfactions in socially approved activities.
Delinquency and Crime in Wartime England
A critical survey of current comments on juvenile delinquency
and the war, compiled by the British Child Guidance Council3 sug-
gests that "in surveying the present problem (of delinquency) it
has to be borne in mind that juvenile delinquency was increasing
year by year for about 10 years up to 1937." Following 1937, the
survey reports, there was a decrease in delinquency rates, to be
followed by a sudden increase with the outbreak of war. The fol-
lowing Home Office figures compare the rate of increase in the first
year of the war with the previous year.
Children under 14 .................... 41 per cent increase
Age group 14 to 17 ................... 22 per cent increase
Age group 17 to 21 ................... 5 per cent increase
All children under 14 years of age were eligible for evacuation.
It is believed that the marked increase in delinquency rates for this
group is the result of the disorganizing experiences associated with
removal from evacuation to reception areas. In considering the 5 per
cent increase for the 17 to 21 age group it must be remembered that
many of them probably had entered the fighting services or had
found employment on the production front.
In contrast to these increases in delinquency rates is the decrease
of 12 per cent in the crime rate for those over 21 years of age. These
figures, if reliable, support the general contention that war increases
delinquency and crime rates among juveniles and lowers the rates
of adult crime.
Although the Home Office statistics on delinquency are most in-
teresting and enlightening, it cannot be emphasized too strongly
that they are at the most tentative and of only limited value because
of the fluctuations in child population due to evacuation, and other
social factors which may not have been properly considered in the
compilation and interpretation of the data.
Delinquency and Crime Statistics in Wartime United States
As previously indicated we have heard from any number of
sources about astounding increases in delinquency and crime rates,
with some reports as high as 50 per cent. The reliability of many of
these local reports should be questioned, and it is suggested that no
comparisons be made, nor final conclusions drawn, until the 1941
and 1942 delinquency and crime statistics of the Federal Bureau of
3 Abridged from Mental Health, July, 1941, and released by The British
Library of Information, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
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Investigation, the Bureau of the Census, the Children's Bureau, the
Bureau of Prisons, and the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts
have been compiled.
At the present time we have but little nation-wide statistics
which will throw light on the subject. The Children's Bureau, which
compiles annual reports from approximately 500 juvenile courts
through its Juvenile Court Statistics Project, has not as yet collected
nor compiled its data for the calendar year 1941. The Bureau of
the Census is now in the process of compiling its statistics for 1941
on cases disposed by State criminal courts, prison intake, prison
population, and discharges. 4 Current figures for the total number of
Federal probationers under supervision, and the number of proba-
tioners received for supervision, as compiled by the Administrative
Office of the U. S. Courts, show no appreciable change from corre-
sponding figures for the fiscal year 1941. The Statistical Division
of the Bureau of Prisons reports a Federal prison population of
22,810 as of May 8, 1942, in comparison with 23,638 for the cor-
responding week in 1941, or a decrease of 829 (3.6 per cent). Fig-
ures on the Federal juvenile offender for the fiscal year. 1942 will
not be compiled until after July 1, 1942.
According to the Uniform Crime Reports5 "the estimated num-
ber of major crimes in the United States during 1941 was 1,531,272,
an increase of 14,246 (0.9 per cent) over 1940." This increase does
not make any allowance for the growth of the general population
during the year which was at least .7 per cent. Thus, the estimated
increase in the amount of crime was largely or entirely balanced by
the increase in the general population.
Until such time as we have complete nation-wide statistics from
these governmental agencies, we shall be unable to make exact sta-
tistical comparisons of rates in delinquency and crime, and we should
be cautious in our use and interpretation of criminal statistics.
Some of our more reliable reports from local jurisdictions, it is true,
may give us some light as to the trend; however, there are many
reports floating about the country which are prepared by persons
untrained in the collection, compilation, and interpretation of sta-
tistics. Too often, no consideration has been given to population
fluctuations, population increases, and other social phenomena.
which may influence delinquency and crime rates.
4 In August, 1942, the Bureau of the Census released the following pre-
liminary figures on prisoners in Federal and State prisons (including reforma-
tories) : On January 1, 1942, there were 156,742 persons in the custody of
prisons as compared with 165,827 on January 1, 1941, a decrease of 5.5 per cent.
During 1941, 81,368 persons were admitted to prisons as against 84,450 in 1940,
representing a 3.6 per cent decrease. A total of 69,279 prisoners were received
from the courts in 1941 as compared with 73,456 in 1940, or a 5.7 per cent
decrease. Discharges from prison show a decrease of 3.2 per cent in 1941.
Since Georgia and Mississippi did not report, these States are excluded
both for 1940 and 1941.
5 Fourth Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. XII, No. 4, released January, 1942.
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Crime-Producing Factors in Wartime England
The following recital of what are generally ascribed as some of
the crime-producing factors in wartime England, and the influence
of these factors on delinquency and crime, is largely based on reports
of the Home Office and Board of Education released by The British
Library of Information.
1. Population Movements, Evacuations, Broken Homes: Homes
have been broken and family and social life disrupted through wide-
spread evacuation of children under 14 to reception areas, and the
absence of either or both parents on production or war fronts. Sep-
aration of the father and mother often resulted in matrimonial
difficulties. Those children and parents who made their exodus
from the evacuation areas were confronted with difficult adjust-
ments to new areas where they had little in common with the social
and cultural life, habits, attitudes, and social values of the new
community. It was observed that leaving home created insecurity
and a feeling of being unjustly punished. Living with complete
strangers often gave the child a feeling of being unwanted. This
was all the more in evidence in the case of children who had been
evacuated repeatedly to different reception areas or assigned to
other homes in the same area.
2. Shelter Life: Millions of air raid victims had to spend their
nights in public and private shelters, often as much as 15 hours
out of 24. Before shelters were effectively controlled some lost cour-
age and self-restraint under the strain of danger, discomforts, and
crowding. Children suffered from broken sleep and were difficult
to manage. Because of lack of sleep schools and parents relaxed on
discipline and school attendance. There was a tendency to condone
minor offenses. The shelter was a refuge for those who wanted to
run away; many escaped parental control by seeking shelters other
than those frequented by their parents. Inability to keep tab on
them gave many children the opportunity to engage in bicycle thefts,
shopbreaking, and other delinquent activities for long periods with-
out being apprehended. Shelter life, also, was the haven for pros-
titutes and sexual offenders of all types.
3. Blackouts: The blackout is alleged to be responsible for many
delinquencies and crimes. Blackouts have sheltered those engaged
in nefarious activities. Assaults on policemen, air raid wardens,
burglaries, wilfully giving wrong change, were common.
4. Increased Demand for Labor: The great derhand for help
on the production front left young boys and girls entirely on their
own resources. Delinquency in many instances resulted from in-
adequate parental control in the home. Youth between 15 and 19,
prompted by relatively high wages and also the country's need for
help in war production, left the controlled school environment for
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the less-restrained atmosphere of industry. Some had no conception
of how to spend or save their money, and even though receiving
relatively high wages, often were brought to court on charges of
petty thefts. Led astray by adult workers, many became involved
in drinking, gambling, and other illegal activities. Many of these
young wage earners are likely to' end up as behavior problems in
the aftermath when they have to readjust to peacetime earnings
and, in some instances, to unemployment. Those withdrawing from
school prematurely, without completing their education or acquiring
vocational skills, will meet heavy competition for employment in the
reconstruction period.
5. Closing of Schools, Recreation Clubs, Playgrounds, and Non-
occupation of Time: Schools and recreational centers were closed
for want of air raid shelters, army quarters, lack of schoolmasters
and recreational leaders (some schools lost as high as 40 per cent of
their schoolmasters), etc. In the evacuation areas a majority of
clubs, hostels and Sunday Schools were closed. Playgrounds were
commandeered for allotments.
Competent observers are of the opinion that the increase of
juvenile delinquency in evacuation areas was due largely to the
free-lance activities of children with nothing to occupy their leisure
time. Calling attention to the ever-increasing desire for pleasure
and adventure in wartime, and the need for social and recreational
activities to meet the needs of youth, the Home Office and Office of
Education concludes :"
... that one of the best means of checking delinquency in wartime, as in
peace, is to provide more, and more varied, social and recreative facilities to
meet the needs and tastes of all sections of the youthful community and to
challenge youthful exuberance to ifiterest itself in useful service.
With the curtailment and closing of recreational facilities and
school activities, very few opportunities for constructive leisure
remained. Youth were unable, in many instances, to make proper
use of their leisure. Thefts were reported in order to secure money
to pay for amusments where monotony and routine prevailed. With-
out guidance in leisure, children sought adventure in playing games
among the ruins. Many have been prosecuted, it is reported, for
having picked up useless articles which may have been lying in the
ruins for months. Such temptations do not occur in normal times,
and it is doubtful whether the dhild fully realized he was doing
wrong. It would be interesting to know to what extent these appar-
ently harmless and meaningless activities had a bearing on Eng-
land's climb in delinquency rates.
Prospect for Delinquency and Crime in the United States
Our country may be spared many of the wartime experiences and
6 Juvenile Offences. Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office (London:
1941), p. 9.
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conditions which confronted England, but we must not forget that
the impact of the war is now being felt by our institutions and social
life in numerous and diverse ways. Heads of households are leaving
their families and home areas for military service or employment
in wartime industries. Mothers are helping to supply the demand
for labor, often leaving children without proper guidance. Boys and
girls are withdrawing from school contrary to compulsory school
attendance regulations to accept employment. Without proper direc-
tion, youth in the United States may be confronted with the same
temptations as youth in England. Families are moving to produc-
tion or camp areas where schools and recreational facilities are in-
adequate, and where children will find difficulty in making adjust-
ments tothe boom town pattern of living. Bad housing and crowd-
ing prevail in these overpopulated areas; building cannot keep pace
with population increases. Our camp towns are attractive spots for
operations of the prostitute and confidence men.
War also may bring new temptations to youth such as gas siphon-
ing; bootlegging of sugar, tires, and other rationed and priority
items; theft of autos, parts, and accessories. Only time will tell
to what extent and in what way war produces and influences crime
in the United States.
Why is it that there seems to be no substantial change in adult
crime during wartime? It might be explained that some of our
trouble makers who formerly were found in our police courts, jails,
prisons, have been successful in obtaining employment, and the less
serious offenders are now serving in the armed forces. In both em-
ployment and military service they find security, a feeling of per-
sonal adequacy, and a sense of participation in a nation-wide effort
toward a common goal. Doubtless many have achieved a sense of
pride in wearing a uniform and having an important part in the
war effort. -Morale is high. In both the armed forces and industry
they have gained a sense of acceptance and equality. For many, the
army or employment is the first really satisfying experience in their
lives-the first time, perhaps, that they ever had a sense of personal
worth. Large numbers will respond favorably to the regimentation
and restraints which are a part of army life. These stabilizing influ-
ences and experiences perhaps explain in part the little or no change
in adult crime during wartime.
If we may judge delinquency and crime trends on the basis of
England's experience in the two wars, and our experience in the
last war, the crime rate of adults may remain relatively constant,
or even show a downward trend. Our juvenile courts, on the
other hand, should anticipate increasing rates of delinquency.
But we must look beyond the present day. At this time we also
should be thinking in terms of what our task will be in the aftermath
of the war. Withcareful planning and preparation today we can in
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measure check and control these inevitable by-products of war,
delinquency and crime.
The Outlook for Probation and Parole During Wartime
It has been said that social work is a luxury in wartime; but
judging from the experience of the Home Office and Board of Educa-
tion in London, any curtailment of social welfare programs is false
economy. Commenting on social services in wartime, The British
Library of Information, in its April 29, 1942, issue of Bulletins from
Britain, concludes:
The outbreak of war has made the maintenance of these services even more
essential. The framework of the social service system remains unimpaired,
while at the same time, many extra services have had to be undertaken by the
Government, for the people to meet the special needs of war. In some cases
these services will remain in existence after the war.
In wartime all social welfare programs should be reenforced;
not weakened. There is no justification for any retrenchment of
public welfare programs nor backsliding of social legislation. If this
be our course, we will have to pay a high price in the postwar re-
construction period, for the home front is just as profoundly signifi-
cant as is the production front or the battle front.
Some probation and parole jurisdictions doubtless will face re-
duced budgets. Staffs and facilities may not be adjusted to meet
fluctuations in delinquency and crime rates. Many of our public
and private agencies, upon whom we are so dependent for assistance
in our investigative and supervisory work, may be forced to limit
the scope of their programs. With increased case loads, reduced
staffs, a larger number and greater variety of problems, and only
limited services from cooperating agencies, probation and parole
cannot be expected to function efficiently.
Probation and parole services also are experiencing a progres-
sive loss of personnel who have entered military service. To date
approximately 10 per cent of the probation officers in the United
States Probation System have been called to the colors.
Apart from the widening scope of their work and their intensi-
fied effort, probation and parole officers are carrying additional
responsibilities directly related to war effort.
Cooperation with Selective Service Boards
Probation and parole officers are cooperating with local boards
and recruiting offices in their consideration of felons who seek en-
listment, voluntary induction, or are about to be inducted through
the regular channels. Doubtless a large proportion of probationers
and parolees, guilty of felonies, today are making excellent records
in military service. Knowing intimately the personal and social
background and past history of the candidate for the armed forces
the probation and parole officer is in a position to render invaluable
service to recruiting offices and local boards.
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It is now generally known that a probationer or parolee, who
has a good reputation in his current civilian life, may be inducted
into the armed forces provided civil custody is terminated at the
time of indudtion, or the parole board or court relinquishes its juris-
diction during the period of military service. It is the probation and
parole officer's responsibility to see to it that only suitable persons
are recommended to recruiting centers and local boards; induction
and enlistment are not channels through which hemay rid his case
load of undesirable persons. It is as much the probation and parole
officer's responsibility to oppose as it is to recommend induction
or enlistment.
The United States Board of Parole, as well as a large number of
State parole boards, will parole a prisoner when it has been deter-
mined by a local board that he will meet the requirements for induc-
tion. The Federal Parole Board also has established a practice of
giving minor parole violators an opportunity to volunteer for induc-
tion rather than returning to 'a penal institution to complete their
sentence.
In their considerations of parolees for the armed forces or the
production front, parole boards should be alert at all times to the
dangers attached to premature paroles.
It is estimated by James V. Bennett, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, that there are 50,000 young men of draft age
from 18 to 35 in American prisons today who are physically fit to
fight and clearly are not disqualified by mental or moral deficiencies.
Our parole boards and other parole authorities have a real challenge
in seeing to it that these prisoners are given due consideration for
induction through Selective Service.
It is interesting to note Sanford Bates' recent comment about
parolees volunteering for military service:
The willingness of prisoners to serve their country in time of emergency
is well attested by the fact that approximately 600 parolees in the New York
City offices of the State Parole Board have applied for induction, and the
Division of Parole has agreed to suspend supervision during their service....
More than half of them have been accepted .... This is even more of a test
of patriotism than the offer of men in prison who are willing to seek their re-
lease on condition that they will be inducted.... This is an all-out war and we
should all be in it. If it offers some of our erring citizens a chance to "square
themselves," why should we deny them that opportunity?
. Cooperation with War Production Industries
Probation and parole officers also render assistance in placing
in war production industries those responsible persons under their
jurisdiction who possess desired qualifications and skills. From time
to time probation and parole officers are told by uninformed em-
ployers that industries fulfilling Federal construction contracts are
prohibited from employing persons on probation and parole. For
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their information, the stipulation in each Government contract with
reference to persons undergoing a "sentence of imprisonment at
hard labor" applies only to contracting and hiring out of the labor
of prisoners-not to probationers and parolees.
Cooperation with the Civil Service Commission
Ten years ago the U. S. Civil Service Commission adopted a
general regulation which prohibited the acceptance of an applica-
tion from a person convicted of a felony until at least two years had
elapsed since his release from prison, parole, or probation. But in
view of the critical shortage of persons qualified for various Gov-
ernment positions essential to the war effort, the Commission has
waived this general prohibition in the case of Federal prisoners,
parolees, and probationers, who, apart from their felony charge,
meet the requirements for a position.7 Applications are now being
accepted conditionally by the Commission but are not certified until
a favorable report is received from the warden of the Federal penal
or correctional institution or the Federal probation officer of the
district in which the applicant resides. This report includes a state-
ment as to background, conduct, education and experience, special
job skills, together with definite recommendations as to whether
the prisoner, parolee, and probationer should be considered for Gov-
ernment employment. On the basis of these reports and recom-
mendations the District Managers of the Commission are authorized
to accept or cancel the application.
As in his relations with the Selective Service boards and war
production industries, to the probation officer is entrusted the re-
sponsibility for selecting and recommending only competent, skilled,
and reliable persons.
Cooperation with the War Department
Probation and parole officers throughout the Nation also are
cooperating with the War Department in providing information
about the past arrest records of inductees whose fingerprint records
have revealed felony charges. Reports received from Federal, State,
and local jurisdictions are helpful to the War Department in deter-
mining whether the selectee is to remain in the armed forces.
Contribution of Prisons and Prisoners to the War Effort
Ninety-five per cent of all production in the Federal prison in-
dustries is directly related to the war effort. Eleven of the 30 Fed-
eral penal institutions are presently engaged in the production of
the following war materials for the armed forces: metal fins for
aerial bombs, cast noses for incendiary bombs, metal bomb racks,
beds and mattresses, tents and water tanks, tarpaulins and stretch-
ers, shell covers, truck covers, duffle bags, furniture, shoes, work
gloves, food trays, brooms and brushes. Several of the insti-
7 Circular Letter No. 3711, June 8, 1942, to District Managers.
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tutions are providing laundry service, canned goods, and dairy
products for nearby camps. The industries are being stepped up to
manufacture a greater number and larger variety of defense ma-
terials. In their war production effort prisoners display enthusiasm,
loyalty, and patriotism, many of them volunteering for longer hours
and night shifts to increase production.
Until a recent decision' of the Attorney General, State prisons
were not permitted to produce goods for the Federal Government,
although many of them had been engaged in the manufacture of
materials for defense activities within their respective States. On
May 22, 1942, the Department of Justice announced that the At-
torney General, in a formal opinion to the President, held there is
no legal barrier to utilization by the Federal Governnient of goods
produced by convict labor in the State prisons. It was pointed out
by the Department of Justice that more than 100,000 inmates in
State prisons throughout the country could be used for war produc-
tion; and it is estimated by Mr. Bennett of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, that these prisoners, many of whom are now idle, would be
capable of producing a $100,000,000 annual output, most, if not all,
of which could be diverted to war use. The decision of the Attorney
General now makes it possible for State prisons and reformatories
to gear their vast resources to the Nation's production offensive.
It is needless to review here the significant contribution made by
prisoners to the war effort through donations to blood bank projects
and the purchase of defense bonds and stamps.
Conclusion
Probation and parole officers and correctional institutions are
playing an important part in work directly related to the war effort,
but let us not minimize the significant role in preventing, checking,
and treating delinquency and crime in the present crisis. Any re-
trenchment at this time in the work of probation and parole, and
institutional programs would be most futile and disastrous.
These are days for conserving the best we have against the in-
roads of war and its by-product-delinquency and crime. This is
not the time for retrogression; we must maintain and strengthen
what we already have achieved. In these troublous days, when
human values are darkened by war, disillusion, and adversity, pro-
bation and parole-especially with the younger offender-will be
confronted with a progressively greater number and variety of
difficult but not insoluble problems. There will be need for extended
service, more intensified effort, and a closer coordination of their
work with other socially significant and essential activities on the
home front. The measure of probation's and parole's contribution
to the defense of the home front is the measure of its continuing
strength in the years ahead.
